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SELECTIONS FROM THE STATE PAPERS OF
THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF INDIA
EDITED BY THE LATE SIR GEORGE FORREST, C.I.E.

EX-DIRECTOR OF RECORDS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

LORD CORNWALLIS

VOLUME II
DOCUMENTS

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LORD CORNWALLIS

PART I

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

CALCUTTA,

February 8, 1790.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

. . . Should any new events occur on the coast to produce an appearance of a necessity of my going there, I shall still think it incumbent upon me to execute my first intention, and you will have an opportunity of observing by the proceedings of the Board that I have in the mean time recommended all the Military and Political measures which seem to be calculated to exact ample reparation from Tippoo for his flagrant breach of the treaty of peace, and so bring the contest with him to a speedy and an honourable issue.

An equal attention to efficiency and economy has been observed in the plan for augmenting your troops at the different Presidencies, and the reinforcements and supplies which will proceed immediately from hence to Madras will, I trust, put it in General Medows's power to act offensively against Tippoo with promptitude and success. . . .

You will observe from our Proceedings that we conceived that we have had reason to disapprove of some parts of the late conduct of the Government of Fort St. George; but as we have required explanations from that Government of some of those acts which we have considered as principally

nation, to stand forth and endeavour to avert the misfortunes with which negligence and misconduct or jealousies between the civil and military departments might be attended. With that view, and upon the ground of State necessity, it was the intention of Lord Cornwallis to take the responsibility of an irregular measure upon himself, and to propose that the Board should invest him with full powers to assume a temporary charge of the civil and military affairs at your Presidency of Fort St. George, by exercising the functions of Governor, as well as those of Commander-in-Chief. His Lordship received with the highest satisfaction the warm approbation which the Members of the Council bestowed upon this determination, and the ready concurrence which they gave to its being communicated to the Government of Bombay, and to the Residents at the Courts of the country powers, before the necessary despatch of other business would admit of its being put in any other form upon the public records. But private advices having lately been received of the arrival of the *Vestal* frigate at Anjingo on the 3rd of January, with a commission appointing General Medows to be Governor of Fort St. George, and as in consequence of the *Vestal's* having proceeded on that day from Anjingo to the Presidency of Bombay, there was every reason to hope that he would be able to take charge of his Government before, or at least as soon as, it would have been possible for Lord Cornwallis to have reached Madras; his Lordship observed that the grounds on which he had formed his first resolution were in a great measure, or perhaps entirely, done away. For as it would have been incompatible with the station which he held in this country that his Lordship should have rendered himself in any degree subordinate to the Government of Madras, and as General Medows is a man of acknowledged ability and character, and regularly invested by your Honourable Court with the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency of Fort St. George, he could not venture to say that, by relinquishing the immediate direction of the Supreme Government after a knowledge of the appointment of General

Medows, his Lordship would not be justly exposed to blame and censure for executing a determination taken a few days before, under belief of the existence of circumstances very different. Lord Cornwallis, upon further considerations, was induced to lay his attention to proceed to the coast entirely aside, unless new occasions should arise calling upon him to resume it.

The declaration of his Lordship's purpose was followed by a Minute from the Members of the Council, in which they expressed their entire concurrence in the reasons assigned by the Governor-General for the change of his former resolution, taking this occasion to assure his Lordship, generally, of their most decided support if any future exigencies should induce him to resume his first intention. They further desired to add a particular assurance, the natural results of the sentiments they expressed in regard to Lord Cornwallis's Administration, that had his Lordship proceeded to the coast it would have been their earnest and constant endeavour to have carried on the public business during his absence according to the principles and regulations at present practised and established, or that his Lordship might have thought it necessary to establish previous to his departure.

Advices received subsequently from the coast, and daily coming in, have left the Governor-General in doubt whether his duty may not yet require him to go there for a short time, in order, if possible, with due regard to the public honour, to prevent further hostilities, and under this circumstance a vessel has been engaged to take his Lordship to Madras if his going there should be rendered expedient.

Private accounts have just come in from Bombay that the *Vestal* frigate had arrived there on the 13th of January, with General Medows' commission to the Government of Fort St. George, and that he intended to proceed to that Presidency on the 20th of the same month, having had intelligence of Tippoo's attack on the Travancore lines.

We have, etc.

effects of preventing our army from entering the Mysore country before the commencement of the Carnatic rains, and consequently of reducing it to a state of entire inactivity till the month of January next.

I have the highest opinion of General Medows's zeal for the public good, as well as for his professional abilities, and I am perfectly convinced that no exertion would be wanting on his part in expediting every arrangement which may be necessary to continue without interruption, or to resume without delay, the execution of our offensive operations, which can alone produce an honourable termination of the war; but if unfortunately our armies in the Carnatic should not be able to act before the beginning of January next, we should not only be under great difficulties to account for the delay to the satisfaction of our allies, but we should also have the most serious grounds for apprehension that Tippoo would avail himself of that opportunity to turn his whole force against the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and endeavour either to weaken their power, or intimidate them into a negotiation for a separate peace.

Under these circumstances it has appeared to me that, exclusive of every measure that may be adopted for promoting our own offensive operations against the Mysore country in the beginning of January, it may be of great consequence to the public interest that some immediate steps should be taken, which may tend to animate and encourage our allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements; and although I am not vain enough to suppose that the military operations would be conducted more ably or with more success by myself than by General Medows, yet from the station which I hold in this country, and from the friendly intercourse which I have hitherto had the good fortune to maintain both with the Nizam and the Peshwa, I conceive it to be possible that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an

encouragement to them to continue their exertions and abide by their stipulations.

I am aware that some inconvenience may arise by my absence from the seat of Government, and that the existing laws do not describe the powers which ought in such a case to be delegated by the Supreme Board to the Governor-General. But notwithstanding these objections, I am so fully impressed with the belief that the public interest will be on this occasion best promoted by my undertaking the direction of the war in person, that I have resolved, with the approbation of the Board, to proceed to Madras in the beginning of the next month; and should the Board concur in opinion with me on the propriety and utility of this measure, I need hardly suggest that it will become necessary to invest me with such powers as may be thought suitable to my station of Governor-General, and which may appear to be calculated to enable me to apply the whole force of the Company with energy for the prosecution of the war, or to avail myself with promptitude and effect of any favourable opportunity that may offer, for negotiating and obtaining an honourable and advantageous peace.

Enjoying as I do the high satisfaction of living on terms of cordiality and friendship, both public and private, with my colleagues in office, and well acquainted as I am with their earnest desire to support my endeavours for promoting the public prosperity, I could not entertain a doubt, even if I had not formerly on a similar occasion been flattered with the most liberal declarations of their confidence, that the measures for the internal government of Bengal which I have hitherto pursued, and in the success of which my share of responsibility is great, will, during my absence, be uniformly supported and punctually executed. The completion of the settlement of the revenues upon the principles which have been already adopted, and adherence to all regulations that have been established, and a strict regard to economy in all branches of the public expenditure, are amongst the principal objects which I trust will command the attention of the members of the Board; and from my knowledge of

arms which must necessarily result from a victory in the sight of his capital, and in the event of my being able to cut off the greatest part of his army, to be prepared to follow up the advantage to the greatest extent that might be possible.

Upon my arrival on the ground which was marked for the encampment at Arrakerry, I saw a considerable body of the enemy at the distance of about six miles in our front, who were drawn up with their right to the river, and their left to a mountain of a very rugged and inaccessible appearance; but I considered them in no other light at that time than as a large detachment sent to observe our motions, without any design to wait for our approach.

My intention to pass the river at that place, if the ford could be rendered practicable, and the hopes that were at first held out of the success of our working parties, occasioned my halting on the 14th in the camp at Arrakerry, and I then obtained certain intelligence that although only a small part of the enemy's force could be seen from the ground in our possession, yet that Tippoo with his whole army had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Caveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep swampy ravine, the passage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole of his front; and that being encouraged by the advantage of this position, as well as those of the intermediate ground, which by the river on our side, and a steep ridge of hills on the other, was narrowed to a space nowhere between the two encampments exceeding a mile and a half, and within cannon-shot of his line not above one mile in breadth he had determined, at the hazard of the event of a battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer approach to his capital.

In consequence of this information, and from my having ascertained from the few people in camp who had any knowledge of the adjoining country, as well as from the observations of intelligent persons who were employed for the purpose, that it was practicable, though difficult, to cross the ridge on our right from the great round on which we were en-

camped to a road which leads from Cenapatam to Seringapatam, I resolved upon that knowledge to attempt, by a night march, to turn the enemy's flank, and by gaining his rear before daylight to cut off the retreat of the main body of his army to the island and fort of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given with the utmost secrecy to the principal officers who were to be employed, that the 19th Dragoons, the three strongest of the native regiments of cavalry, His Majesty's six regiments, and twelve battalions of native infantry, with field-pieces only, should be in readiness to march at eleven o'clock at night, leaving their piquets and camp-guards behind, and their tents standing; and Colonel Duff, with these detachments and the remainder of the army (except the Nizam's Horse, who were directed to follow me at daylight), was left in charge of the encampment, provisions, stores, and heavy artillery.

We had suffered greatly during the preceding week by rains uncommonly frequent and heavy so early in the season; but unluckily on that particular night we had for several hours the most violent thunder, lightning, and rain, that I have seen in this part of India.

The ground of our encampment having been intersected by some ruined villages and inclosures, and several deep ravines, much valuable time was lost before it was possible to form the troops in the order of march which was directed; and owing to the heavy rain and excessive darkness of the night, I was obliged to halt so frequently, after I had begun to move forward, either on account of many of the regiments losing at different times the line of march, or of the weakness of the gun-bullocks, which were jaded and exhausted by the severity of the storm, that I had only advanced a few miles when the day began to dawn.

All hopes were then at an end of being able to execute my original plan, but having accomplished the part of the march that had been described to me as the most difficult, and having the utmost confidence in the valour and discipline of the King's and Company's troops, I determined to persevere in endeavouring to force Tippoo to hazard an

patam ; and I directed him, after descending the Ghaut with the troops under his command, to put them into cantonments on the coast of Malabar during the rains, and until the proper season should return for recommencing our operations.

The effects of several circumstances from which we had already suffered many inconveniences, pressed upon us particularly hard at this juncture, and none more than the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry, who were now, if possible, more inactive and more inattentive to my requisitions than ever.

Far from rendering the services that I had expected from so numerous and powerful a body of horse, in facilitating our foraging and covering extensive tracts of country from which our followers as well as themselves might have obtained considerable supplies of provisions, they had, regardless of my remonstrances since the commencement of our march from Bangalore, hardly ever sent a detachment beyond the piquets of our infantry, and had persevered in exhausting the small stock of forage and provisions which, in spite of the devastation made by the enemy, was generally found within the bounds of the encampments, and which, if we had not been encumbered with them, we could have commanded for the use of our own army.

By this extraordinary degree of obstinate supineness, that large body of men, with their horses and numerous followers, about this time experienced the severest distress from scarcity, and the vast multitude of people belonging to our army, for whom it is impossible for the public to carry a stock of provisions, were reduced to nearly the same situation. Rice became so dear in the bazars that either the pressure of hunger or the temptation of the extravagant prices proved too powerful against all precautions that could be taken, and occasioned depredations of the grain that had been provided and brought with us to supply the fighting men of the army to so alarming an extent that the apprehension that there would be a want of grain for the soldiers long before the stores that had been provided for them ought to

have been expended, operated powerfully with other reasons to force me to fall back to Bangalore.

Urgent, however, as our own necessities were to move nearer to our supplies, I could not leave Tippoo at liberty to employ his whole force against General Abercromby, and therefore resolved to remain in my position near the ford, which held the main body of the enemy's army in check at Seringapatam, until I should have reason to believe that General Abercromby was out of all danger of being interrupted in his retreat, by Tippoo's either marching in person or considerably reinforcing the corps which I knew he had detached against him, which alone was not of sufficient strength to make me apprehend that it could give General Abercromby any material molestation.

In the mean time I gave directions to burst eleven heavy guns (eight eighteen and three four-and-twenty pounders), to bury and destroy the military stores that could not be carried with us, and to deliver nearly the whole of the rice in our possession to the troops, which, on a calculation of easy marches, would have been sufficient to subsist them until they should arrive at Bangalore—measures which had now become the more indispensably necessary, as, in addition to the losses of public cattle that had suffered from the causes that I have now mentioned, an epidemic disorder not uncommon in this country had broke out among them, and had carried off several thousands in a few days.

Having remained long enough to give ample time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my encampment near the ford on the morning of the 26th, with the intention to proceed to Bangalore, and to employ a few months in refreshing and refitting the army, and to make every other necessary preparation for renewing our operations against the enemy's capital as soon as the rivers should subside, unless Tippoo should in the mean time agree to make such concessions as the Committee might reasonably think they had a right to exact.

Upon reaching the ground that had been ~~left~~ ^{left} the first day's encampment, I was told, to my great

from which he declared his instructions did not authorise him to recede, it was thought most advisable by Hurry Punt and Meer Allum (who are invested with full powers from their respective Governments), as well as myself, that he should be requested, after having given him a few days for consideration, to return to his master, and he accordingly proceeded to him from Bangalore on the 24th of last month.

We have not yet received any further message from Tippoo, but I think it highly probable that he will soon renew his proposition for opening a negotiation; and should he at any time appear to be seriously disposed to acquiesce in terms of accommodation which a regard for your honour and interests, as well as those of the Allies will render it incumbent on us to demand, the strongest considerations, both public and private, will insure my most cordial exertions to bring this contest to a speedy conclusion.

I must, however, confess that although it may be possible that, in case of his other schemes being unsuccessful, he may see the necessity of submitting to our demands before the Confederate forces shall be completely ready to move again towards his capital, yet I see no good reason to believe that he has any other design at present than that of endeavouring to disunite the Confederates by underhand intrigues amongst them; and I shall certainly therefore not relax in the smallest degree in forwarding the necessary preparations to enable me, as soon as the season will permit, to resume the most vigorous prosecution of offensive operations.

You are so well informed by your own records of the characters and dispositions of our Allies, that I need hardly state to you that in transacting business with people differing so much from ourselves in language, manners, and customs, so unsystematic in their natures, so ignorant of the military science, and so liable to be biassed from the pursuit of a general good by private and selfish views, many difficulties are unavoidably experienced; and I shall only assure you that neither temper nor perseverance shall be wanting on my part to preserve union amongst the different members of the Confederacy, and to draw the utmost exertions that

may be practicable from them for promoting the general prosperity.

I have thought it my duty to give you the above general statement of the occurrences of the last campaign and of our present situation, and before I conclude this letter I must, in justice to the officers and soldiers both of the King's and Company's troops who compose this army, give my public testimony that during the course of a campaign which from a concurrence of circumstances has been singularly arduous, they have manifested patience under fatigue and scarcity, gallantry in action, and a general spirit of zeal for the honour and interests of their country, to an extent which in my opinion has never been exceeded by any troops whatever, and which gives them a just claim to the warmest and most substantial marks of your approbation. . . .

I have, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL ORDERS.—FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAFT IN
LORD CORNWALLIS'S OWN HANDWRITING.

CAMP BEFORE SERINGAPATAM,
February 6, 1792.

The army to march in three divisions :

Right—

General MEDOWS.

36th and 76th Regts.—Lieut.-Colonel NESBITT.

3rd Brigade.—Lieut.-Colonel COCKERELL.

1st Battalion 6th Brigade.

Lieutenant LENNAN'S Pioneers.—Engineers.—Scaling ladders.

Centre—

Lord CORNWALLIS.

Lieut.-Colonel STUART.

52nd, 71st, and 74th Regts.—Lieut.-Colonel KNOX.

4th Brigade.—Major RUSSELL.

2 Battalions 6th Brigade.—Major LANGLEY.

Lieutenant DOWSE'S Pioneers.—Engineers.—Scaling ladders.

the combined force should proceed without delay to invest the south side of Seringapatam, or that the General should previously send to the top of the Ghaut for his heavy artillery.

More minute inquiries into the internal state of the Nizam's troops obliged me to relinquish that plan, for I found that the Minister's talent for securing regular supplies for the troops under his command fell so far short of his zeal to promote my wishes and the general interests of the Confederacy, that his corps could not be detached even for a few days to any considerable distance from our bazars and our northern communications without exposing it to suffer great distress from want of provisions; and as neither Hurry Punt's health, nor the condition of his army, admitted of his undertaking that service in the room of Azeem ul Omrah, I was subsequently obliged to direct General Abercromby to cross and join me on the north side of the river.

Although all my hopes were at an end of receiving any immediate assistance from Purseram Bhow, and I concluded that our difficulties would be greatly increased by that disappointment, I neither deviated from the execution of the general outlines of the original plan of the campaign, nor felt diffident of ultimate success; but at the same time I stated my sentiments on his conduct in very strong terms, both to himself and to the Court of Poonah, and as the forces under his command were peculiarly well calculated for giving essential aid either in holding the place closely invested, or in making head against any corps which Tippoo might keep in the field for the purpose of intercepting our supplies during the siege, I requested of him to quit the pursuits in which he was engaged and move (late as it was, and different from the plan that had been settled) with the utmost expedition by the route that he had marched last season towards our army.

The Bhow had met with considerable success in his desultory expedition, for by the good conduct of Captain Little, and the gallantry of the three Bombay battalions under his command, he totally defeated, in a thick woody

country in the neighbourhood of Samoga, the corps commanded by the Nabob Riza Ali, which Tippoo had stationed in that quarter for the protection of the Bednore country, and in consequence of that victory he obtained possession of Samoga after a slight resistance, and of all the other posts belonging to the enemy, within a few miles distance from the town of Bednore; and it afterwards appears that although he had reasonable grounds then to flatter himself that the place would soon have fallen into his hands, he came to a sudden resolution to return from thence by rapid marches to join us, which he effected two days after the preliminaries of peace were signed. But whether his determination to return to the southward was owing, as it was reported, to his having received peremptory orders to that effect from Poonah, or to the letters that I had written to him, I do not know, nor have I now thought it worth while to be at much pains to ascertain.

There was in the mean time no intermission in the exertions that were necessary to complete our own preparations, and to enable me to proceed to attack the enemy's army and capital with the Confederate forces under my own immediate direction, and as soon as I could move from the neighbourhood of Hooliadroog I advanced, and after a few easy marches encamped, on the 5th of February, behind the French rocks, at the distance of about seven or eight miles from Seringapatam.

Upon my arrival there I found, conformable to information that I had previously received, that Tippoo, trusting to the strength of his position, appeared to have determined to keep his ground, and as the badness of all the fords near the town, and indeed the security of our northern supplies, put it equally out of my power to attempt to pass the river with the main army and all its stores and heavy artillery, I did not hesitate in resolving to attack him, his removal being an indispensable preliminary to the commencement of the siege of his capital.

In order, therefore, to be enabled to take proper measures for carrying my determination into execution, the afternoon

establishing communications to the breaches across the north branch of the river, to carry on the attack against the space which includes the Sultan Bastion and the Western Cavalier; and although the weakness of the wall, the shallowness of the ditch, and the incomplete state of part of the glacis in that quarter would, perhaps, have appeared to me to afford sufficient grounds for that resolution, I was still further encouraged to adopt it by having ascertained that it would at this season of the year be practicable to throw the greatest part of the water of the Caveri out of the two branches that form the island of Seringapatam, by repairing and improving a dam that goes across the river a few miles above the island, which seems to be an ancient work, and constructed, like several others on the Caveri, for the purpose of forcing part of the current into canals that have been cut with great skill and labour, to furnish water for the cultivation of a long tract of land on both sides of the river.

Having determined upon the above plan of attack, it became necessary to strengthen further our posts upon the island, in order that I might be able, without endangering their safety, to withdraw some part of the force that had hitherto been sent upon that duty, to assist in carrying on the siege.

Strong working parties, in addition to those that were constantly occupied in making fascines and gabions, were accordingly employed to render those posts secure; and this object being accomplished, six battalions were allotted as a stationary guard of the island, and for furnishing such working parties as might be necessary to afford a certain and ample supply of fascines and gabions for the works.

Our arrangements of every other kind being likewise completed, the trenches were opened on the night of the 18th February, and on the following morning General Abercromby was ordered to cross the river with nine battalions about two miles above the ford to occupy an advantageous and strong position at the distance of about random cannon-shot from the works, and he was instructed

to make immediate preparations for carrying on approaches, and for constructing batteries to assist in destroying the enemy's works, and to enfilade the whole front that was to be attacked.

During the time that the military operations that I have described were carrying on with unremitting vigour, Tippoo, sensible of the danger of his situation, had made several overtures to treat with the Confederates; and a few days after the action, a negotiation was opened by deputies from all the parties, which, after various discussions, terminated the contest.

Before the Confederate armies moved from the neighbourhood of Outradroog, letters were received from Tippoo, in which he repeated his request to be permitted to send Vakeels to treat; but with the warm approbation and concurrence of Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah, I told him that I should insist upon his executing the capitulation of Coimbatoor as a preliminary to all negotiation.

In answer to my letter he denied that any capitulation for that garrison had taken place between Lieut. Chalmers and Kumarwad-dien Khan; and as it was far from my wish to drive him to despair by treating so shameless an assertion in the manner it deserved, and by that means shutting the door against all treaty, I replied, with the same concurrence of the Confederates, that it depended entirely upon himself to state this matter in a clear and uncontrovrtible light by communicating again with Kumarwad-died Khan upon the subject, and by a personal examination of Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, who were still in his possession; and that if I had been misinformed he could, without the least prejudice to his interests, as I should engage that neither of the gentlemen should serve against him during the war, easily convince me of it by sending out Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, or one of them, to declare the truth.

Of this proposition he took no notice till after the defeat of his army; but in the afternoon of the 8th he sent to camp Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash and the few other Europeans that had been taken with them at Coimbatoor, ac-

the Company as being necessary to form a secure barrier for our new possessions on the coast of Malabar against every Power above the Ghauts, appeared at one time to be almost insurmountable.

At this stage of the negotiation the Allies were not only in possession of his two sons as hostages, but also of above eleven hundred thousand pounds of the sum that he had agreed to pay in ready money, which I should have considered as sufficient pledges from any other man for the performance of the whole of the preliminary articles, but faithless and violent as Tippoo's character was known to be, I judged it incumbent upon me to be prepared to support by force, if it should prove necessary, the rights that we had acquired by the preliminaries; and with that view I requested, in addition to several other measures, that Purseram Bhow would cross the Caveri and join General Abercromby, in order that we might be ready to act with efficacy and without loss of time against Seringapatam if a renewal of hostilities should become unavoidable, resolving at the same time that the armies should not quit the positions that they occupied until the articles of the definitive treaty should be arranged and actually signed.

As any material interruption, and still more a total breach in the negotiation, would have been attended with great inconvenience in our affairs, I was relieved from much anxiety when Tippoo, upon further reflection, withdrew all his objections, and consented on the 16th ultimo to sign the definitive treaty; and the first payment of one crore and sixty-five lacks of rupees being also completed in a few days, Purseram Bhow repassed the river, and after evacuating the trenches and our posts upon the island, all the Confederate forces began to move from Seringapatam on the 26th ultimo. The orders for the mutual cession of forts and districts conformable to the treaty having also been previously interchanged, I trust that in the course of a few weeks Tippoo will be in possession of the dominions that are left to him, and that the armies of the Allies will have returned within the new boundaries of their respective countries.

It must no doubt be highly gratifying to you that a war into which we were forced by every consideration of good faith and sound policy has not only terminated in the reduction of the strength of a neighbour of great power and of the most inordinate ambition, but also in securing acquisitions to ourselves which, exclusive of their inestimable value in point of situation, add considerably to your revenues, and promise to open sources of commerce in pepper, cardamums, teak, sandal-wood, etc., that may be looked upon as of great importance both to the Company and to the nation.

By the statement of Tippoo's revenues upon which it was finally agreed by all parties that his country should be divided, according to the terms of the preliminary articles, the Company's portion amounted to something above thirty-nine lacks and a half of rupees of net revenue; and by an inspection of the General Map you will readily perceive that although, in order to reduce the Company's share to that sum I was obliged to relinquish a few small districts on the top of the Ghauts that properly belonged to the Barramaul, but which are not necessary for the security of our frontier, I have availed myself of our right of selection, by demanding and obtaining for the Company's portion countries that are both strong in themselves, and peculiarly well calculated to form a barrier to your ancient possessions.

The districts ceded to us on the coast of Malabar consist of the whole of the tract of country below the Ghauts laying between Travancore and the Kaway River, which is our northern boundary, and they are so fortunately situated that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Tippoo or any future sovereign of Mysore to disturb them.

Palacatcherry commands the only road by which an army can approach them from the Carnatic side. The only passes that lead into them from the Mysore country—viz., the Tambercherry and Pondicherrum Passes, are, from their belonging to our tributaries, in reality in our own possession; and the northern frontier is, from the ruggedness of the country, and from its being intersected with a number of

deep ravines and several considerable rivers, exceedingly inaccessible.

Dindigul constitutes a substantial protection to the southern provinces, and by the acquisition of the Barra-maul, and of the country which, though composed of several different districts, is commonly called the Salem country, which gives us the command of all the passes of the Ghauts to the northward of the Caveri, we have obtained an effectual barrier to the Carnatic against all future invasions of the westward; and exclusive of the principal forts of Sankery-droog, Namcool, Ottoor, Khistnagerry, and Ryacotta, which no power in India could take from us, and which an invading army could not pass without hazarding the loss of its supplies, there are a number of smaller forts in those districts that, in case of a temporary irruption of a corps of cavalry, would be capable of affording great protection to the persons and property of the inhabitants.

Had the extent of our share of the cessions made by Tippoo admitted of it, I should have had great satisfaction in adding the country of Coimbatore to the Company's other possessions, principally for the purpose of depriving the Mysore power of all footing below the Ghauts on the Carnatic side; but the disappointment is of the less consequence as it is a defenceless open country which, in case of a future rupture, nothing less than Tippoo's whole force could attempt to defend against us, and from which he could not, without the greatest difficulty and danger, venture to invade the Carnatic.

A pass called the Caveriporam Pass is marked upon some of the sketches of that part of the country, but as it does not appear that Tippoo or his father ever brought guns down that pass, there is no good reason to suppose that it is at present, or that it could easily be made practicable for an army; and having lately had occasion to order a detachment to ascend the Guzzlehutty Pass, we have had an opportunity to ascertain that it is, of all the passes leading into the Carnatic, by much the most steep and difficult.

The nature, therefore, of the pass by which his artillery and stores must come from Mysore, would prove no inconsiderable obstacle to Tippoo in forming a design against the Carnatic from that quarter; and as I trust that he could neither take Dindigul, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Sankerydroog, or Namcool, which are our frontier forts on that side, I look upon it to be almost impossible that he or any of his successors will venture to pass the Coleroon with an army into the centre of the Carnatic, leaving their supplies and communications of all kinds exposed to be attacked and interrupted by the garrisons of the places that I have mentioned, supported by bodies of troops that might be stationed for the purpose under their cover and protection.

I am convinced that Sir Charles Oakeley and General Abercromby will select the most capable and trustworthy of your servants to manage the newly-acquired territories; and General Abercromby agreed so perfectly with me, that it was of the utmost importance for the national character and for the interest of the Company that we should commence our government of the countries on the coast of Malabar upon a good plan, that it was concerted between us that it would be most prudent, before we divided them finally into districts, to appoint Commissioners to make a temporary settlement with all the chiefs for this season, and then to proceed upon an active and earnest investigation of the amount of revenue that those acquisitions are capable of paying, the extent of the different articles of commerce, the natures of the tenures of the Rajahs or other chiefs, and the classes and numbers of the inhabitants, in order that the Supreme Government may be enabled from their report, and the observations and suggestions of the Government of Bombay, to propose a system for the future management of that country which may include rules for the conduct of the revenue and commercial departments, and above all for a strict and impartial administration of justice; and as many of the Bengal servants have had great experience in conducting the internal business

of extensive Indian Provinces, it is my intention to depute two of those in whom I can place particular confidence, as soon as the change of the monsoon will render it practicable, to join two Commissioners that General Abercromby will at my recommendation appoint, immediately to commence upon the undertaking that I have described, and to assist in collecting the necessary materials, and in framing the report that will be expected from them.

The Malabar coast has been in a state of great distraction and confusion since the time that Tippoo's troops and the officers of this Government were driven out of it, the two great and inimical classes of the people, the Nairs and the Moplas, being almost at open war with each other, and great dissensions about boundaries and revived old claims prevailing amongst the Nair Rajahs themselves; but as General Abercromby will, immediately upon descending the Ghauts, detach troops into the different districts, I hope that I shall soon hear that tranquillity has been restored, and the Company's authority completely established throughout all those countries. . . .

It must give you very great satisfaction to hear that there neither is at present, nor will be at the arrival of the troops in quarters, one single rupee of arrears due to them, or to any of the public departments, and that the accounts of all descriptions of military expenditure are so closely brought up that I can at present see no good reason to prevent the three Presidencies from making up, in the course of the next six months at farthest, distinct statements of the whole of the extraordinary expenses that have been incurred by the war. . . .

Purseram Bhow, with the corps under his immediate command, proceeded directly from Seringapatam towards his own country, and Hurry Punt and the Nizam's son and Minister will separate from this army in a few days. General Abercromby commenced his march to the coast of Malabar on the 26th ultimo, and was on the same day joined by Captain Little's detachment, which had only

been engaged to serve with the Maratta army during the Maratta war.

I have, etc.,
CORNWALLIS.

P.S.—Tippoo's country having been divided according to its revenue, and not its extent, it will be obvious to you that the Nizam and Marattas could not, in the highly cultivated and fertile countries in which their portions were claimed, receive the same number of square miles that fell to the Company, as in our portion the Coorga country is included, which pays only a small and limited tribute, and there are considerable tracts of hilly and barren ground in several of our other districts; and for similar reasons, the division left to Tippoo greatly exceeds in the number of square miles the whole of that which was ceded to the Allies, as the rugged and unproductive countries of Mysore and Chittledroog constituted the principal portion of the dominions that remain in his possession.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

FORT WILLIAM,
August 20, 1792.

SIR,

Although there seems at present no reason to apprehend that Tippoo will for a considerable period be disposed to come to a rupture with any of the members of the late Confederacy, yet as it is of great importance for preserving our reputation for good faith, as well as for the general interests of the British nation, that the grounds should be clearly explained on which the Allies can, in consequence of the 13th and 15th articles of the treaties of alliance that were formed at the commencement of the war, demand assistance and support from each other against any hostile attempt of their late common enemy, I look upon it as proper and desirable that the treaty of guarantee, which they are bound to enter into, should with all convenient despatch

be put into a distinct form, and I therefore wish that you should take an early opportunity to confer fully with the Ministers upon this subject.

Every consideration will induce me to examine and discuss any propositions that may be made by him in the most amicable manner, but the greatest care must be taken that no vague or ambiguous expression shall be admitted into this new instrument, and that the stipulations shall in no shape go beyond the spirit of the article upon which they will be founded.

I shall defer entering much into detail until you can inform me of Nana's sentiments and expectations, but it is proper that you should be acquainted with my ideas of the general principles which should form the basis of the agreement.

The Allies are bound to guarantee against Tippoo the territories that each of them might possess at the conclusion of the war, but it must always be adverted to that the stipulation is merely defensive, and cannot operate unless Tippoo should attack either of them without just provocation.

It must therefore be clearly expressed in the treaty of guarantee that in case any difference should arise between one of the latter and Tippoo, the other Allies are to have a right to expect that the nature and circumstances of such difference shall be fully communicated to them in order that they may give their opinion and advice, and endeavour to settle it by a temperate negotiation, and that they shall not be considered as bound to take up arms in his favour until they are convinced that he has justice on his side, and all means of conciliation shall have proved fruitless.

Should a rupture become unavoidable, the interest and safety of the contracting Powers will be so evidently and deeply involved in the event that it would be highly injudicious in them to limit their exertions in endeavouring to bring it to a speedy and honourable conclusion, and it must consequently be stipulated that the whole force of each State is to be employed for that purpose.

The distress and danger of the party that may be attacked being entitled to the greatest attention from the other members of the Alliance, it ought to be understood and settled that, whilst no time should be lost in preparing their whole force to take the field, every immediate assistance that may be practicable should be afforded with such troops as may be in actual readiness for service.

The above are the fair principles for the treaty of guarantee, and to render any further treaty unnecessary in the event that Tippoo's conduct should again force us into hostilities during the existence of the guaranteee, it may be proper to insert in it that a general plan of operations for the Confederate forces is to be concerted as soon as possible after a rupture becomes certain, and that conformable to the terms of the Alliance that was made at the commencement of last war, were if any of the parties shall enter into separate negotiations, but that (under the exclusion of unreasonable objections) all measures for concluding a peace shall be conducted with the knowledge and approbation of the whole.¹

You will communicate to Sir J. Kennaway the particulars and result of your conferences upon this point, that you may act in entire conformity with each other.

I am, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.

¹ This letter is copied from a transcript made by a native scribe. Many errors arose from these scribes being ignorant of the English language, and sometimes, as in the present instance, it is impossible to correct them.

PART II

LAND ADMINISTRATION

MINUTE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

September 18, 1789.

The great ability displayed in Mr. Shore's Minute which introduced the propositions for the settlement, the uncommon knowledge which he has manifested of every part of the revenue system of this country, the liberality and fairness of his arguments and clearness of his style, give me an opportunity which my personal esteem and regard for him and the obligation I owe him as a public man for his powerful assistance in every branch of the business of this Government, must ever render peculiarly gratifying to me the duty of recording my highest respects for his talents; my warmest sense of his public-spirited principles which, in an impaired state of health, could alone have supported him in executing a work of such extraordinary labour; and lastly, my general approbation of the greatest part of his plan.

I am confident, however, that Mr. Shore, from his natural candour, as well as the public at large, will readily admit that, deeply interested as I must feel myself in the future prosperity of this country, it would be unjustifiable in me to take any steps of real importance upon the suggestion even of the most capable adviser without seriously weighing it in my own mind, and endeavouring to reconcile the propriety of it to my own conviction.

Impressed with these sentiments, I am called upon by a sense of indispensable duty to declare that I cannot bring

myself to agree with Mr. Shore in the alteration which he now proposes to make in the Second Resolution of leaving out the notification to the land-holders that if the settlement shall be approved by the Court of Directors it will become permanent, and no further alteration of the jumma take place at the expiration of the ten years.

When the Court of Directors determined to retain in their own hands the right of confirming or annulling the settlement at the expiration of a given term, they undoubtedly acted with becoming wisdom and caution.

The power of making a perpetual irrevocable settlement of a great empire without being subject to the revision of the controlling authority at home would, in my opinion, have been too great to delegate to any distant Government. I cannot, however, believe that they would have held out the flattering hopes of a permanent settlement, which alone, in my judgment, can make the country flourish and secure happiness to the body of inhabitants, unless they had been predetermined to confirm the perpetuity, if they found that their servants here had not failed in their duty, or betrayed the important trust that had been reposed in them. Nothing, I am persuaded, but our expressing doubts and fears can make them hesitate; and as I have a clear conviction in my own mind of the utility of the system, I should think it a duty I owe to them, to my country, and to humanity, to recommend it most earnestly to the Court of Directors to lose no time in declaring the permanency of the settlement, provided they discover no material objection or error, and not to postpone for ten years the commencement of the prosperity and solid improvement of the country.

Mr. Shore has most ably and, in my opinion, most successfully, in his Minute delivered in June last, argued in favour of the right of the Zemindars to the property of the soil. But if the value of permanency is to be withdrawn from the settlement now in agitation, of what avail will the power of his arguments be to the Zemindars, for whose right he has contended? They are now to have their property in farm for a lease of ten years, provided they will

very unwillingly with the sovereignty of the Isle of Man, appears to me to be exactly in point.

I agree with Mr. Shore there would be a degree of absurdity in Governments taking into their own hands the gunges, etc., which are annexed to zemindary rights, and leaving the same abuses existing in those which belong to jaghire and altumgha possessions; but instead of leaving the former on that account, I should most undoubtedly take away the latter, securing the proprietors a liberal and ample equivalent for all such duties as were not raised in absolute and direct violation of the orders of Government.

There are, however, several articles in what are called the Sayer collections with which Government has no occasion to interfere, and which may very well be left in the hands of the proprietors.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO LORD SOUTHAMPTON.

CALCUTTA,

November 7, 1789.

MY DEAR LORD,

I received, by the hands of Mr. Colebrooke, your letter dated the 20th of March, with the enclosed note from the Prince of Wales, and I can assure you that I read it with the greatest concern, as it made me apprehend, what would be very painful to me, that I should appear backward and disinclined to exercise any commands that His Royal Highness might think proper to honour me with.

I thought it had been long since universally known in England that no man can hold an office in this country who is not in the service of the East India Company; and I asked Mr. Colebrooke how he could undertake such a voyage with his family without making some inquiries about the country to which he was coming, adding that any person at all conversant with the affairs of India would have informed him that it was utterly out of my power to give him anything,

and that no recommendation, however great and powerful, could be of any material use to him.

You will easily judge of my surprise when he told me he had not been so imprudent as I had imagined, that he had consulted what he conceived to be the best opinions, and that it was Sir John Macpherson who advised him to come to India, and who assured him that there was no doubt that with such a recommendation as he brought I should provide for him.

If this is true, which I own I have some difficulty in believing, Sir John must have forgot everything that passed upon my first arrival in the country, when in his presence I tied up my hands against all the modes that used to be practised for providing for persons who were not in the Company's service, such as riding contracts, getting monopolies in Oude, extorting money for them from the Vizier, etc.

If I was to create offices, or extra-offices, which is a term I do not very well understand, I should not only disgrace myself, and undo everything I have been doing since I landed in Bengal, but I should render a very short-lived service to the person for whom they were created, for if I was to forget my duty, and betray the trust which is reposed in me, the Court of Directors would not forget theirs, and they would undoubtedly annul such appointments the instant they heard of them.

I must beg of you, my dear Lord, to state what I have said, in the strongest but most respectful terms to the Prince of Wales, who has so much goodness that I am sure for my sake he would not wish me to do an act that would degrade my character; and for the sake of his country he would not desire that I should set an example that would prove ruinous to the public interests, and lay a foundation for the renewal of those abuses that had well-nigh overset our Indian Empire.

I am, etc.,
CORNWALLIS.

circumstances, allowing for the common variations in the state of society, in the improvement and in the decline of agriculture, and admitting the probable alterations in the value of silver, it is certain that the constancy of the assessment may be of great inconvenience, and even ruinous to many of the contributors; and in this case there will be a necessity of some future alterations, which must always take place to the disadvantage of Government if the assessment be now declared fixed for ever.

Were there any grounds for supposing that a system which secures to the land-holder the possession of his lands and the profits arising from the improvement of them will occasion a decline in agriculture, then might we apprehend that a permanent assessment would, in a progress of time, bear hard upon the contributors; but reason and experience justify the contrary supposition: in which case, a fixed assessment must be favourable to the contributors, because their resources will gradually increase, whereas the demand of Government will continue the same.

Equally favourable to the contributors is the probable alteration in the value of silver; for there is little doubt that it will continue to fall, as it has done for centuries past, in proportion as the quantity drawn from the mines and thrown into the general circulation increases. If this be admitted, the assessment will become gradually lighter, because as the value of silver diminishes the land-holder will be able, upon an average, to procure the quantity which he may engage to pay annually to Government with a proportionably smaller part of the produce of his lands than he can at present.

The circumstance of the country being occasionally liable to drought and inundation, which Mr. Shore adduces as an argument against a permanent assessment, appears to me strongly in favour of it. The losses arising from the drought and inundation are partial and temporary; the crops are damaged or destroyed; the land is neither swept away by inundation nor rendered barren by drought, but in the ensuing year produces crops as plentiful as those

which it would have yielded had it not been visited by those calamities.

Now, if Mr. Shore's calculation of the proportion which the Zemindars in general receive for the produce of their lands be accurate, it is obvious that every temporary loss must fall upon Government; for so long as we profess to leave the Zemindars no more than that proportion, and claim a right to appropriate the excess to the public use, from what funds are they to make these losses good? But when the demand of Government is fixed, an opportunity is afforded to the land-holder of increasing his profits by the improvement of his lands; and we may reasonably expect that he will provide for occasional losses from the profits of favourable seasons.

The necessity, therefore, of granting remissions to the landholders for temporary losses will diminish in proportion as the produce of the lands increases and exceeds the demand of government.

But let us suppose that hereafter it should be found necessary to grant remissions in districts which may suffer from drought or inundation, this is no argument against a permanent assessment; for under the present system of variable assessment we are frequently obliged to grant considerable deductions on these accounts, and there is no prospect of our being able to discontinue them so long as the country is assessed at its full value, and no more is left to the landholder than is barely sufficient for his subsistence, and for defraying the charges of collecting the rents from his lands.

There is this further advantage to be expected from a fixed assessment in a country subject to drought and inundation, that it affords a strong inducement to the land-holder to exert himself to repair as speedily as possible the damages which his lands may have sustained from these calamities; for it is to be expected that when the public demand upon his land is limited to a specific sum, he will employ every means in his power to render them capable of again paying that sum, and as large a surplus as possible

give it as my opinion that the Zemindars neither now nor ever could possess a right to impose taxes or abwabs upon the ryots; and if from confusions which prevailed towards the close of the Mogul government, or neglect or want of information since we have had possession of the country, new abwabs have been imposed by the Zemindars or farmers, that Government has an undoubted right to abolish such as are oppressive and have never been confirmed by a competent authority, and to establish such regulations as may prevent the practice of like abuses in future.

Neither is the privilege which the ryots in many parts of Bengal enjoy of holding possession of the spots of land which they cultivate, so long as they pay the revenue assessed upon them, by any means incompatible with the proprietary rights of the Zemindars. Whoever cultivates the land, the Zemindars can receive no more than the established rent, which in most places is fully equal to what the cultivator can afford to pay. To permit him to dispossess one cultivator for the sole purpose of giving the land to another would be vesting him with a power to commit a wanton act of oppression, from which he could derive no benefit. The practice which prevailed under the Mogul government, of uniting many districts into one Zemindarry, and thereby subjecting a large body of people to the control of one principal Zemindar, rendered some restriction of this nature absolutely necessary. The Zemindar, however, may sell the land, and the cultivators must pay the rent to the purchaser.

Neither is prohibiting the land-holder to impose new abwabs or taxes on the lands in cultivation tantamount to saying to him that he shall not raise the rents of his estates. The rents of an estate are not to be raised by the imposition of new abwabs or taxes on every begah of land in cultivation; on the contrary, they will in the end be lowered by such impositions; for when the rate of assessment becomes so oppressive as not to leave the ryot a sufficient share of produce for the maintenance of his family and the expenses of cultivation, he must at length desert the land. No

Zemindar claims a right to impose new taxes on the land in cultivation ; although it is obvious that they have clandestinely levied them when pressed to answer demands upon themselves ; and that these taxes have, from various causes, been perpetuated to the ultimate detriment of the proprietor who imposed them.

The rents of an estate can only be raised by inducing the ryots to cultivate the more valuable articles of produce and to clear the extensive tracts of waste land which are to be found in almost any Zemindarry in Bengal. It requires no local knowledge of the revenues of this country to decide whether fixing the assessment, or leaving it liable to future increase at the discretion of Government or its officers, will afford the greatest encouragement to the land-holder to have recourse to these means for the improvement of his estate.

In support of the opinion which I expressed upon former occasions respecting the large proportion of waste land in the Company's territories, I have annexed some extracts from the correspondence of the collector in the Dacca Province, etc. ; and whoever will take the trouble to consult the public proceedings, will find there are many districts, both in Bengal and Behar, which are not better cultivated than those alluded to in letters of the above-mentioned collectors.

It does not appear to me that the regulations for the new settlement confirm all existing taxes if, upon enquiry, they shall appear unauthorised and of recent imposition ; nor that the Zemindars will be entitled to deductions upon the abolition of them.

With regard to the rates at which landed property transferred by public sale in liquidation of arrears, and it may be added, by private sale or gift, are to be assessed, I conceive that the new proprietor has a right to collect no more than what his predecessor was legally entitled to, for the act of transfer certainly gives no sanction to illegal impositions. I trust, however, that the due enforcement of the regulations for obliging the Zemindars to grant pottahs to their ryots, as proposed by Mr. Shore, will soon remove this objection to

recommend that the proposed settlement should be made with a blind precipitation, or without our having obtained all the useful information that, in my opinion, can be expected of the real state and value of the different districts.

Twenty years have been employed in collecting information. In 1769, supervisors were appointed; in 1770, provincial councils were established; in 1772, a committee of circuit was deputed to make the settlement, and armed with all powers of the Presidency; in 1776, aumeens¹ were appointed to make a hustabood² of the country; in 1781, the provincial councils of revenue were abolished, and collectors were sent into the several districts, and the general council and management of the revenue was lodged in a committee of revenue at Calcutta, under the immediate inspection of Government. Like our predecessors, we set out with seeking for new information; and we have now been three years in collecting it. Voluminous reports have been transmitted by the several collectors on every point which was deemed of importance. The object of these various arrangements has been to obtain an accurate knowledge of the value of the lands, and of the rules by which the Zemindars collect the rents from the ryots.

The collectors in Behar, not even excepting the two to whom Mr. Shore alludes as having declared it impracticable to make the proposed settlement, have already, with great appearance of benefit to the Company and of advantage to the natives, made considerable progress in executing the instructions that they have received for making the ten

¹ Aumeens, ameen: The word is Ar. 'amin,' meaning a trustworthy person, and then an inspector, intendant, etc. In India it has several uses, as applied to native officers employed under the civil courts, but nearly all reducible to the definition of *fide commissarius*. Thus an ameen may be employed by a court to investigate accounts connected with a suit, to sell or to deliver over possession of immovable property, to carry out legal process as a bailiff, etc. The name is also applied to native assistants in the duties of land survey.

² 'Hustabood' (P. 'hast-o-bud'), literally, which is and was. A comparative account; an examination by measurement of the assets or resources of the country, made immediately previous to the harvest; and also, in a more general sense, a detailed inquiry into the value of lands financially considered.

years' settlement, conformable to the orders of the Court of Directors ; and in every instance where it has been stated that further time was necessary to acquire a minute knowledge of the resources of any particular district, the Board has readily acquiesced in allowing a partial delay.

I shall certainly be no less inclined to recommend the observation of the same rule during the progress of the settlement in Bengal and Orissa ; and in those districts that, from long mismanagement, are evidently in a state of decline and disorder I shall not only willingly agree to postpone the settlement for a twelvemonth longer, but also assent to any modification in it that may appear to be applicable to their present condition. But after having adopted those and such other measures as may appear necessary from the reports and explanations which may be laid before us by the different collectors whilst they are engaged in the execution of our instructions, I must declare that I am clearly of opinion that this Government will never be better qualified, at any given period whatever, to make an equitable settlement of the land revenue of these provinces ; and if the want of further information was to be admitted now or at any other future period as a ground for delaying the declaration of the permanency of the assessment, the commencement of the happiness of the people and of the prosperity of the country would be delayed for ever.

The question which has been so much agitated in this country, whether the Zemindars and talookdars are the actual proprietors of the soil or only officers of Government, has always appeared to me to be very uninteresting to them ; whilst their claim to a certain percentage upon the rents of their lands has been admitted, and the right of Government to fix the amount of those rents at its own discretion has never been denied or disputed.

Under the former practice of annual settlement, Zemindars who have either refused to agree to pay the rents that have been required, or who have been thought unworthy of being entrusted with the management, have, since our

we shall find that, in countries in which this maxim is one of the leading principles in the imposition of taxes, the valuation of the land on which they are levied is never varied.

In raising a revenue to answer the public exigencies we ought to be careful to interfere as little as possible in those sources from which the wealth of the subject is derived.

Agriculture is the principal source of the riches of Bengal; the cultivator of the soil furnishes most of the materials for its numerous manufactures. In proportion as agriculture declines the quantity of the materials must diminish and the value of them increase, and consequently the manufactures must become dearer and the demand for them be gradually lessened. Improvement in agriculture will produce the opposite effects.

The attention of Government ought therefore to be directed to render the assessment upon the lands as little burdensome as possible; this is to be accomplished only by fixing it. The proprietor will then have some inducement to improve his lands, and as his profits will increase in proportion to his exertions, he will gradually become better able to discharge the public revenue.

By reserving the collection of the internal duties on commerce, Government may at all times appropriate to itself a share of the accumulating wealth of its subjects without their being sensible of it. The burden will also be more equally distributed; at present the whole weight rests upon the land-holders and cultivators of the soil. Whereas the merchants and inhabitants of the cities and towns, the proprietors of rent-free lands, and in general all persons not employed in the cultivation of the lands, paying revenue to Government, contribute but little, in proportion to their means, to the exigencies of the State, it is evident, that varying the assessment on the lands is not the mode of carrying into practice the maxim that all the subjects of a State ought to contribute to the public exigencies in proportion to their incomes, and

that other means must be employed for effecting this object.

In case of a foreign invasion, it is a matter of the last importance, considering the means by which we keep possession of the country, that the proprietors of the land should be attached to us from motives of self-interest. A land-holder who is secured in the quiet enjoyment of a profitable estate can have no motive in wishing for a change. On the contrary, if the rents of his lands are raised in proportion to their improvement; if he is liable to be dispossessed should he refuse to pay the increase required of him; or if threatened with imprisonment or confiscation of his property on account of balance due to Government upon an assessment which his lands were unequal to pay, he will readily listen to any offers which are likely to bring about a change that cannot place him in a worse situation, but which hold out to him hopes of a better.

Until the assessment on the lands is fixed, the constitution of our internal government in this country will never take that form which alone can lead to the establishment of good laws and ensure a due administration of them. For whilst the assessment is liable to frequent variation, a great portion of the time and attention of the supreme Board, and the unremitting application of the Company's servants of the first abilities and most established integrity will be required to prevent the land-holders being plundered and the revenues of Government being diminished at every new settlement; and powers and functions which ought to be lodged in different hands must continue, as at present, vested in the same person; and whilst they remain so united we cannot expect that the laws which may be enacted for the protection of the rights and property of the land-holders and cultivators of the soil will ever be duly enforced.

We have by a train of the most fortunate events obtained the dominion of one of the most fertile countries on the face of the globe, with a population of mild and

other, yet in this country, more than in any other, agriculture must flourish before its commerce can become extensive. The materials for all the most valuable manufactures are the produce of its own lands. It follows, therefore, that the extent of its commerce must depend upon the encouragement given to agriculture, and that whatever tends to impede the latter destroys the two great sources of its wealth. At present almost the whole of your revenue is raised upon the lands, and any attempt to participate with the land-holders in the produce of the waste lands would (as we have said) operate to discourage their being brought into cultivation, and consequently prevent the augmentation of articles for manufacture or export. The increase of cultivation (which nothing but permitting the land-holders to reap the benefit of it can effect) will be productive of the opposite consequences. To what extent the trade and manufactures of this country may increase under the very liberal measures which have been adopted for enabling British subjects to convey their goods to Europe at a moderate freight, we can form no conjecture. We are satisfied, however, that it will far exceed general expectation, and the duties on the import and export trade (exclusive of any internal duties which it may in future be thought advisable to impose), that may hereafter be levied, will afford an ample increase to your resources, and without burdening the people or affecting in any shape the industry of the country.

From the proceedings which we shall forward to you by the next despatch, you will find that we have anticipated your wishes respecting the pattahs to be granted by the land-holders to the ryots. It is with pleasure we acquaint you that throughout the greater part of the country specific agreements have been exchanged between the land-holders and the ryots, and that where these writings have not been entered into, the land-holders have bound themselves to prepare and deliver them by fixed periods. We shall here only observe that under the new arrangements to which we shall presently advert, the ryots will always have it in their own power to compel an adherence to the agreements by an

appeal to the courts of justice whenever the land-holders may attempt to infringe them.

We now come to the very important part of your instructions empowering us to declare the tax assessed upon the lands in the provinces fixed for ever.

From the advices which we have forwarded to you since the date of the latest letter acknowledged in your instructions, you will have perceived that so far from any circumstances having occurred to defeat your reasonable expectations of the result of the settlement, the jumma of it has exceeded the estimated amount, and that every occurrence has tended to confirm and strengthen the decided opinions which we formerly expressed of the expediency of the measure. We are not aware of any material reason that would render it advisable to postpone the declaration, whereas there are a variety of considerations which appear to us to make it highly expedient that the valuable rights and tenures which you have conferred upon the land-holders in these provinces should be announced to them without delay. The seasons this year have been remarkably favourable, and abundance reigns throughout the country. The public credit is high, the paper in circulation bearing an interest of 8 per cent. selling at a premium of 1 per cent., and the interest of money is proportionably low. As this paper is in course of payment, there is every ground to expect that the large capitals possessed by many of the natives (which they will have no means of employing when the public debt is discharged) will be applied to the purchase of landed property as soon as the tenure is declared to be secure, and they are capable of estimating what profit they will be certain of deriving from it by the public tax upon it being unalterably fixed. With respect to those land-holders with whom a ten years' settlement has been concluded, the announcing to them that their jumma is fixed for ever, will not only incline them to pay their current revenue with cheerfulness, but add to their ability to discharge it by the credit which they will obtain from the increased value of their tenures. On the other hand, the declaration will not fail to render the few land-

General of the 2nd of June, already express a diffidence of our sincerity. I beg leave, therefore, to propose to the Board, that we should avail ourselves of the opportunity of the change in the Government to draw a distinct line for our own future conduct, and that I should be directed to write to the Peshwa accordingly.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO GEORGE FORSTER, Esq.

CAWNPORE,

October 23, 1787.

SIR,

You are already acquainted with my principal reasons for employing you in your present mission to Moodajee Boosla, the acting chief of the Berar Government. Should Tippoo abstain from hostilities against our territories or those of our allies, you will content yourself with declaring that you were despatched by me, to assure Moodajee of my esteem and friendship for him, and of the concern that I take in the honour and prosperity of his Government. You will also inform him, that as his servant Beneram Pundit,¹ on account of his great age and infirmities, could not undertake so long a journey, you were selected by me as a person in whom I have entire confidence, to receive those unreserved and important communications to which he alluded in his letter to Beneram Pundit, which was shown to me. You will also, during your residence with Moodajee, in the case that has been supposed, take every means that may be in your power, consistent with the utmost attention to avoid every step that might excite jealousy or suspicion of an unfriendly or indiscreet curiosity, to obtain a knowledge of the extent, revenues, and forces of the Berar Government, and of the real character and disposition of Moodajee, as well as of the other members of his family, and of the persons who are principally

¹ Beneram Pundit had been sent, many years before, as envoy from the Raja to Calcutta. He accompanied Hastings to Benares, and gallantly stood by him in all his danger. He was afterwards Dewan, or Minister, to the Raja.

employed in the management of the public affairs. It will also be of great importance to ascertain the particular relation or connexion of that Court with the other Maratta Chiefs, and the heads under which the principal parties of that State are at present ranged; and also the nature of the connexion between Moodajee and the Nizam, and of any correspondence that may have passed between him and Tippoo. For the above purposes, it will be sufficient to deliver the General Credential letter No. 1 with which you are furnished.

Should you receive certain information of Tippoo's having actually commenced hostilities against us or any of our allies that were included in the late peace, you will deliver to Moodajee the letter No. 2, with which you have been charged with a view to the possibility of that event.

We are so little acquainted with the real disposition, the political views, and several other circumstances of the present situation of the principal Maratta Chiefs, that it is not in my power to give you detailed instructions for your conduct. If the Marattas have engaged or resolved to keep peace with Tippoo, it is not probable that our solicitations would induce them to depart immediately from that plan: and the more earnestly we pressed such solicitations, the chance would be the less for their being successful. Even should their public measures be in some degree undetermined, much appearance of anxiety on our part would be construed by them to proceed from conscious weakness, or they would endeavour to take an unfair advantage of it in settling the terms of any connexion which might be proposed to be formed. You will therefore, after delivering the letter and professing an inclination to form a close connexion and alliance against Tippoo as a common enemy, go no farther than requesting that Moodajee will give immediate orders for a free passage through Cuttack for such troops as this Government may think proper to despatch at any time by that route for carrying on the war, unless your advances are received with an apparent cordiality. In that case a negotiation may be commenced,

part of his Excellency with a little patience, rather than attempt to renew the species of interference in the details of his Government through the medium of our Resident, which has been so judiciously reprobated by your Honourable Court, and from which I have ever most carefully abstained.

The causes to which I have alluded occasioned some delay in reaping all the advantages that might result to both countries from the late commercial arrangements; but the mutual utility of the treaty is apparent, and our large and increasing collections of duties at the Custom-house at Maunjee are sufficient proofs of the particular benefits which have already arisen from it to the commerce of the provinces.

Mr. Duncan's conduct has contributed to promote the extension of commerce and agriculture, and great progress has been made in establishing a system for the regular administration of justice, which alone can secure the happiness of the body of the people in that valuable province.

The great additional resort of Deccan merchants to the mart of Mirzapore, and the applications that have been lately made for tracts of ground to increase the buildings at that place, have been very pleasing indications of the commercial improvements; and it has likewise been with peculiar satisfaction that I have lately received a convincing proof of the good effects of his judicious management upon the minds of the neighbouring powers by an application from Nana Furnavese, the First Minister of the Mahratta State, for leave to build a house for himself in the city of Benares, for the avowed purpose of resorting to it occasionally to perform religious duties; and this application has given me the more pleasure, as the resolution was deliberately adopted upon the report of Mhadajee Pundit, his own household Dewan, whom he sent privately last year with a caravan of pilgrims to make his observations, and who it seems had given a most favourable account of the mildness and the regularity of the British Government.

The future substantial interests of the Company, and the

prosperity and happiness of millions of people, are so deeply concerned in the plan of settlement of land revenue of those provinces, that before I should proceed to execute the orders contained in your revenue letter, dated the 12th April, 1786, I thought it my indispensable duty to acquire every information in my power, and to give the whole subject the most mature consideration.

Although Mr. Shore's precarious health has frequently interrupted his exertions, I consider it as singularly fortunate that the public could profit from his great experience and uncommon abilities upon this important occasion.

His exertions were no less able than laborious in obtaining the materials that were necessary for arranging the principles on which the settlement of the province of Bahar is proposed to be made. But as the revenue letter from the Board gives you a full account of the plan of that settlement, I think it unnecessary to trouble you with a particular statement of it.

There will probably be very little alteration in the principles of the plan that will be adopted for the settlement of Bengal, and after having given the subject much serious consideration, I think myself bound, in justice to my own feelings, and to my opinion of the true interests of the Company, and the British nation, to declare my strongest conviction that the outlines of the plan now proposed, are well calculated to secure and even increase your revenues, and at the same time to raise the national reputation, by its giving a prospect of comfort and happiness to the natives of those valuable dominions far beyond that which they have hitherto enjoyed under any other masters.

Many subsidiary arrangements will be requisite to render the principles of the plan applicable to the various rights and customs that exist in different parts of those provinces, and they must be made by Government either as the propriety of them may appear to observation, or as cases may be brought forward by representation.

The security of property, however, and the certainty which each individual will now feel of being allowed to

of his Excellency's rank and dignity at having been witness for a train of successive years of the perseverance with which Scindia has pursued schemes of unbounded ambition and avarice in Hindostan.

I cannot therefore admit, upon the most partial consideration of their relative situations, that Scindia's complaints against the Vizier are founded upon such valid grounds as to justify his throwing threats out of public resentment.

For though I do not approve of his Excellency's showing countenance or furnishing shelter to Scindia's professed political enemies, yet as those men have only become his enemies in consequence of his own ambition and a systematic plan of encroachment, the protection which may have been offered to some of them by the Vizier cannot be viewed by any means in so offensive a light as if they had been native Marattas, or had been for a considerable time in a state of submission to the Maratta Government.

It will be proper that you should take an early opportunity to discuss this subject fully with Scindia; and after claiming the credit, to which we have so just a title, for the sincerity with which I have adhered to my professions to him since my arrival in India, and which he has experienced in the most substantial manner, by the strict neutrality which this Government has observed during several delicate and intricate turns in his affairs, you will convey to him the substance of what I have stated, in the most friendly and conciliatory language. I should wish you at the same time to be at pains to explain to him that, although the general principles of his own political conduct ought, in my opinion, to render him cautious in preferring public complaints against the Vizier of the nature of those that have been lately under discussion, yet that I am ready to allow that his Excellency's behaviour to him on several occasions has not been entirely blameless. And you may assure him that from that consideration, as well as from my personal regard for him, and my respect for the Maratta State, I shall always be ready to interpose my good offices with the Vizier, to obtain his acquiescence to all Scindia's reasonable

requests. But you will always endeavour to make Scindia sensible that, should his Excellency's aversion to such compliances as I may from time to time recommend, prove invincible by means of persuasion, it would not only be indelicate, but highly unjustifiable in me to employ any other mode to induce an ally, with whom we are connected by the strictest ties of friendship and mutual interests, to comply with requisitions which, in my own opinion, cannot in strict justice be demanded from him. . . .

Should Scindia, contrary to my expectations, declare that he will not overlook (or depend entirely on my interference to endeavour to procure redress for) any future similar grounds of complaint that may be furnished by the conduct of the Vizier, and should think proper to express a resolution to show his resentment by any public acts, you are to recommend to him in civil but in the most explicit terms, to weigh very maturely the consequences that may follow his executing such a determination; and notify to him, in a manner that cannot be misapprehended, that I shall consider any act of injury or insult to the Vizier or his subjects, precisely in the same light as if it had been offered to any of the immediate subjects or dominions of the Company. . . .

The particular circumstance of Scindia's having become a principal on the side of the Marattas in the late treaty of peace, and the long connexion which has now subsisted between him and this Government, has hitherto rendered it expedient to station a Resident with him, though I must confess that it is somewhat problematical whether the measure is necessary or advantageous to the Company.

From the authority which seems to have been delegated by the Peshwa's Government to Ali Behaudur¹ and Tunkojee

¹ Ali Behaudur, grandson of the Peshwa Baji Rao by a Mohammedan woman. He was in the service of the reigning Peshwa, and was sent by Nana Furnavese with an army to join Sindia in his invasion of Hindustan. After separating from him, he made conquests for himself in Bundelkund, which, after his death in 1802 at the siege of Kalinjar, were seized by the Peshwa and Sindia. They are now mostly in the possession of the Company, but his descendants are still nabobs of Banda in Bundelkund.

35. The pernicious effects upon the state of the European regiments, which have been already experienced, and would ever be felt from the frequent removals of officers from European to native corps, would alone induce me to recommend that these two branches of the service should be entirely separated, and no interchange of officers be in future admitted between them; but should frequent reliefs take place in the European branch, an additional objection would arise to the appointment of officers to native corps from European regiments, in opening a possible door to the abuse of patronage in a Commander-in-Chief, by putting it in his power to give an officer just arrived from Europe, who has had no opportunity to acquire the language, or the least knowledge of the manners and customs of the natives, an advantageous situation in the native branch of the service, which might be attended with the most ruinous consequences to the public interest.

It is true that in point of qualification for the duties of an European regiment there could be no material objection to the removal of officers from the native to the European branch; but as it is proposed that the officers of the native branch shall have a prospect of equal advantage in their own line with the officers of the European branch, it would become unjust to allow the former to interfere with the promotion of those who are not suffered to enjoy a reciprocal advantage.

37. No distinction should, in my opinion, be made either in the mode of promotion of officers, or in any other respect, between the Company's European troops that may be transferred to the King's service, and those of the corresponding branches which at present compose His Majesty's army; but some deviations from the rules that are sufficiently suitable to the European troops will be necessary in the native branch of the service, particularly in regard to the promotion of officers, which I recommend to be made (with certain exceptions that will be proposed under the head of Native Establishments) by regimental seniority as far as the rank of Major, and afterwards by seniority in the

line at each Presidency : because I conceive it to be improbable that the indulgence of a temporary leave of absence which the officers of the native troops will enjoy, in common with those of the European regiments, will afford them the same advantage of obtaining support from their connexions at home as the others may derive from a more permanent residence near them, in consequence of the occasional reliefs of the European corps ; and I therefore think that the officers whose services are unalterably fixed in so distant a quarter of the globe ought to be protected by established regulations against the hazard of suffering by the abuse of patronage in any Commander-in-Chief.

38. I am perfectly aware that the assistance of European non-commissioned officers is extremely convenient to the officers of the native corps ; and, when proper non-commissioned officers can be found, that they are in several respects of substantial use in that branch of the service ; but as I know that in an European regiment it is seldom possible to find a sufficient number of sober and properly-qualified men to fill its own establishments of non-commissioned officers, and it would be unreasonable to expect that the European regiments would consent to derange their own internal economy and discipline, by parting with careful non-commissioned officers, I shall not propose that description of men as part of the native establishment ; and as I shall recommend a considerable augmentation of commissioned European officers to the native troops, I do not apprehend that this alteration can occasion any material detriment to the service.

39. It is also proper to observe that it is impracticable to procure, in a short time, a considerable number of men of proper caste, and of sufficient size and strength for the duties of a soldier, for the native troops on the Madras and Bombay establishments ; and that on the contrary, an unlimited number of men of the best quality for native soldiers may at any time be raised in a very short period for the Bengal troops, from the populous provinces in that quarter of the Company's dominions.

ought to be an established rule that the pay of all officers under the rank of Colonel, whether of the European or native branch of the service, should be stopped after the expiration of the period which has been proposed for their leave of absence from India; and, to render all solicitation ineffectual for the recovery of such pay it should, when stopped, become immediately the property of some charity fund in India.

121. Should the stoppage of pay prove inefficacious for inducing officers to return without further loss of time to their duty in India, the names of such of them as shall prolong their stay in Europe two years beyond the above-mentioned period are, without admitting any excuse whatever, to be struck out of the list of the army as having resigned the service, and their vacancies to be filled up according to the standing regulations. . . .

The following articles provided that officers appointed to regiments in India (if not on the strength of the additional company) must embark within two years after being gazetted. In consideration of the incidental expenses, Indian officers appointed to the staff are, as a general rule, to continue upon it for four years. Staff officers, besides their liberal pay, to receive allowances in time of peace for travelling expenses, camp-equipage, etc., with an increase in time of war.

Leave may be given to General Officers and Colonels of regiments in India not required on the staff to reside in Europe; but neither there nor in India will they receive more than regimental pay and the profits of the off-reckoning fund.

The army to continue furnishing officers to fill the posts of Military Auditor-General, Judge-Advocates, Fort-Majors and Adjutants, General Commissioners of Stores, etc., etc.; but all so employed to be on the strength of some European or Native regiment: no officer, after the embarkation of his own regiment, being permitted to hold any staff office in India excepting those of Military Auditor-General or deputy, Adjutant and Quarter-Master General or deputies; Fort-

Major or Adjutant, and A.D.C., staff officers having certain indulgences as to visiting Europe. . . .

135. As the above propositions not only secure a competent income to the military officers serving in India during the early periods of their service, but also the substantial advantage and gratification of an opening being made for their attaining high military rank, as well as the indulgence of being enabled to visit Europe occasionally without relinquishing their pay, and the satisfaction of having it in their power to spend the latter part of their lives in their native country, either by retiring on their full pay, by selling their commissions, or by remaining in service until they obtain the command and emoluments of a regiment—all ideas must be given up in the army of looking for perquisites or advantages in any shape whatever beyond the open, avowed allowances which shall be allotted to the respective ranks; and if any officer shall be detected in making such attempt, he ought to be tried by a General Court Martial for behaving in a manner unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, and, if convicted, be dismissed from the service.

136. The collection of bazar duties, and the practice in some parts of India of making usurious loans, at country stations, to aumildars, zemindars, and other natives, being two of the most objectionable of the modes by which officers have acquired emoluments in India, are to be particularly pointed out to them as being strictly prohibited; and any officer who shall be convicted before a General Court Martial of having disgraced himself and the character of his profession by having been guilty of either of those practices ought to be dismissed from the service, and, if possible, to be obliged to refund the money that he may have acquired by such unworthy means.

137. The only exception from the above regulation should be made in the case of an army or detachment upon actual service in the field during the war; when the Commanding Officer may be permitted to levy a moderate duty upon spirits and intoxicating drugs, for the purpose of re-

the separate orders already noticed, absolutely precluding him from any emolument whatever excepting such as are publicly allowed; and when you are further pleased to consider that, excepting instances of extraordinary merit, your servants cannot in future expect to obtain the office of a collector under a period of twelve years spent in your service, we trust that we shall be found to have consulted your true interests with every compatible attention to economy, and that you will approve the allowances and commission fixed by us for your servants in the revenue department.

We have, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.¹

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF
THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

ON THE GANGES,

August 19, 1787.

GENTLEMEN,

. . . With your explicit instructions before us, we could be at no loss respecting our conduct in any disputes that could arise with the French Government in India. The intemperate stile of M. de Souillac's letter appeared to me extremely improper for our imitation, but I trust that you will approve of our answer to it. I wish earnestly, however, to avoid, if possible, all further altercations with the subjects of that nation; and it will give me particular pleasure if the points upon which they have hitherto arisen can be finally adjusted in Europe. In that hope, and in the conviction that the dignity of this Government will not in the meantime suffer, I was induced to propose some delay in the execution of your order to resume the exercise of our right to search the French ships, and it will give me great satisfaction to know that it is not considered by you as an act of too much forbearance.

The result of my conferences with Hyder Beg Khan is

¹ All letters from the Governor-General in Council are signed by the Governor-General, and by one, generally by two, members of the Council. It has not been thought necessary to give the latter names.

fully stated in my letter to the Vizier, and by his Excellency's answer it is now rendered a final agreement between the two Governments. If I have deviated in any point from the letter of such of your instructions as apply to this negotiation, I trust it will appear that I have paid strict attention to their spirit and substance.

In adjusting the public account we have only given up a part of a large balance of difficult, if not impossible, recovery, and principally composed of articles to which our claims were neither sanctioned by your authority, nor ever admitted by him to be just; and by formally relinquishing all interference in the internal affairs and management of his Government, our connexion is reduced to plain and simple principles. We undertake the defence of his dominions against all foreign enemies upon receiving a subsidy equal to all the civil and military expenses that will be incurred by an engagement of so much value to him. Our commerce with Oude, but particularly the maintenance of a large body of troops in peace which, according to contingent events, may be usefully employed in time of war, are the great advantages that will result to us from those stipulations.

The orders to recall the Futtighur brigade, with which Hyder Beg was well acquainted, occasioned some embarrassment. It was not easy to make him comprehend that, by the late alterations in our military establishment, so small a force for the defence of Oude as one of our present brigades would greatly fall short of the intentions at home when those orders were given. I was, however, obliged by a sense of public duty to state to him my clear opinion that two brigades in Oude would be indispensably necessary for the mutual interest and safety of both Governments.

The loss of Colonel Baillie's,¹ and of several other

¹ Hyder, with his whole army, attacked this detachment near Perambaucum, September 10, 1780. Colonel Baillie was killed, and nearly his whole corps—about 3,700 Europeans and natives—was destroyed. Among the few survivors, who were made prisoners, was Sir David Baird, not above three or four wounded sepoys escaping. Colonel Baillie of Dunain was the head of that family.

regular examination and check of all expenditures in the Civil departments, and I am persuaded that the salary which we have annexed to it will appear to you to be a very moderate compensation for the diligent and faithful discharge of so responsible a duty.

The augmentation of salaries which we have recommended for the members of the Board of Revenue will merit your attentive and favourable consideration. It is of the utmost importance for your service that revenue servants of experience and abilities should be induced by liberal allowances to become members of that Board; and a thorough knowledge of the internal state of the country, as well as uniformity of principle in directing the details of the collectors, is of so much real value for the comfort of the mass of the people and for the successful realisation of your land revenues, that it cannot fail to promote the public good to render the situation of the senior members (upon whose able conduct so much must depend) so advantageous that they may have no wish to be removed to any other office under the Government. . . .

Few circumstances have given me more sincere gratification than the voluntary public-spirited proposition of Sir William Jones to engage in the arduous undertaking of translating and forming a compilation of Hindu and Mussulman laws from the highest and most approved authorities of the respective religions, to be applied for the use and guidance of our native courts of justice.

The thorough knowledge which Sir William has acquired of the Eastern languages, joined to the extent of his literature and the strength of his natural abilities, constitute qualifications for executing the work that he has undertaken, which perhaps cannot in any other man be paralleled, and considering it singularly fortunate for this Government to be able to obtain the assistance of such a person, I could make no hesitation in granting from the public purse the moderate monthly sum that he required for defraying several articles of contingent expense, but particularly for allowing salaries to some learned eminent moulavies and

pundits during the time that he might have occasion to employ them in selecting and extracting the most salutary of their respective laws from the numerous volumes in which they are at present dispersed.

It is calculated by Sir William Jones that this work may be executed in two years, and if it can be accomplished according to the original plan it will justly render the name of its author dear to the natives of this country by enabling their European rulers to govern them according to their own ideas of humanity and justice. . . .

I have great satisfaction in congratulating your Honourable Court on the acquisition of the Guntoor¹ Circar to the Company. Former transactions respecting the Guntoor had persuaded me of the Nizam's² disinclination to relinquish that Circar, and I had therefore been induced, since my arrival in this country, by several considerations which related to public affairs of India as well as to those of Europe, to decline touching upon a subject which it was more than probable would be offensive to that Prince, and especially at a time when it would not have been prudent to have employed our power, if found necessary, to enforce our demand.

The friendly communication which we had established with several of the native powers had obviated part of my reasons for delay; but the accounts which I received of the settlement of the affairs of Holland, by removing all hazards

¹ Guntoor Circar: The word 'Circar' (Hind. 'Sircar,' from Pers. 'Sarkar,' head of affairs) was applied under the Mohammedan Government to certain extensive divisions of territory. The Northern Circars contained the following extensive divisions: Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Ellore, Condapatty, and Guntoor, which are now divided into the following districts: Ganjam, most north of Madras, Vizagapatam, Godaverry, Kistna, and Guntoor. These provinces on the coast of Coromandel were assigned to Bussy (1753). They were ceded to Clive by a formal grant of the Moghul Emperor in trust; the Madras Government ignored the firman of the Emperor, and made a treaty with the Nizam of Hyderabad, by which they agreed to pay a yearly tribute of £70,000 for the Northern Circars. The Circar of Guntoor was not to be made over to the East India Company until after the death of Basalur Jang, the Nizam's eldest brother.

² Nizam: Nizam Ali usurped the throne of Hyderabad in 1761, and murdered his brother, Nizam Salabut Jang, in 1763.

are all, however, desirous that as much forwardness as possible should take place in the business, either with a view to final completion, or further information. For this purpose I trouble you with this letter. From the instructions to Colonel Cathcart formerly sent to you, and the papers herewith sent, you are in the full possession of all our ideas; and if no material objection occur to you against it, we would suggest to you the propriety of selecting some person from among those in India, in whose discretion and abilities you can confide, and employing him to make his way to China, either as a secret agent and without any avowed authority, or as commissioned by you to settle such points as fall within the sphere of your Government. By means of such a person, sent in whichever of these modes you may judge most prudent, we conceive you may receive information as to such particulars of the Chinese Government, dispositions and commercial wants, as may enable you and us to judge how far we are justified in the notion we entertain of the importance of a more extended commercial connexion with China, and how far there is a reasonable prospect of our being able to accomplish it.

I have, etc.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO LORD HOOD.

CALCUTTA,

December 4, 1789.

MY LORD,

I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter dated the 31st of January, and I can assure you that it would at all times give me pleasure to have it in my power to manifest my personal esteem for you, and that I should be disposed to think favourably of those persons for whom you profess yourself to be interested.

The anxious concern, however, that you will easily believe I take in the future welfare and prosperity of this country led me long since to consider of what infinite

importance it would be that the seat at the Supreme Board should be properly filled; and for that purpose I named some men of whose abilities and integrity I had seen the clearest proofs, and strongly urged the Government at home to endeavour to procure their nomination.

So far, therefore, from being at liberty to assist Mr. —— on the present occasion, your Lordship must be sensible that I am under the necessity of being his opponent; but I cannot help adding that if I was totally disengaged, and however favourably I might in other respects be disposed to think of Mr. ——'s character, and to feel for his misfortunes, I could never bring myself to assist any man in obtaining a seat in the Supreme Council of Bengal who had dissipated his fortune at the gaming table.

I am, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

(Private and Confidential.)

April 4, 1790.

DEAR SIR,

In my other *private and confidential* letter I have contented myself with giving the most precise and minute answers in my power to some of the queries that you stated in your letter addressed to me, as well as to the Governors of Madras and Bombay. But as I am very sincerely anxious for the reputation and permanency of the present administration, and shall ever feel most warmly concerned for our national prosperity in the country, I should not act a friendly part by you, or properly in other respects, if I omitted on this occasion to give you my sentiments most freely on some of the principles that may come under discussion when you proceed to frame a plan for the government of our Indian possessions after the expiration of the Company's present charter.

I must acknowledge that I was happy to hear that the principles of that plan were still under deliberation, and

so notorious, that no military man who has been in this country will venture to deny it, and I do not care how strongly I am quoted as authority for it.

The circumstances, however, of the native troops are very different. It is highly expedient, and indeed absolutely necessary for the public good, that the officers who are destined to serve in those corps should come out at an early period of life and devote themselves entirely to the Indian Service; a perfect knowledge of the language, and a minute attention to the customs and religious prejudices of the sepoys being qualifications for that line which cannot be dispensed with. Were these officers to make a part of the King's army, it would soon become a practice to exchange their commissions with ruined officers from England, who would be held in contempt by their inferior officers, and in abhorrence by their soldiers, and you need not be told how dangerous a disaffection in our native troops would be to our existence in this country. I think, therefore, that as you cannot make laws to bind the King's prerogative in the exchanges or promotions of his army, it would be much the safest determination to continue the native troops in the Company's service, and by doing so you would still leave to the Court of Directors the patronage of cadets, and of course give some popularity to the measure.

The ultimate line to be drawn would give to the Court of Directors the appointment of writers to the Civil branches of the service, and of cadets for the native troops, and the power of prescribing certain general rules under the descriptions I have mentioned, for the disposal of offices by the Governments in India, and of calling the Governors, etc., to an immediate account for every deviation from these rules; but they ought to be strictly prohibited from appointing or recommending any of their servants to succeed to offices in this country, as such appointments or recommendations are more frequently granted to intrigue and solicitation than to a due regard to real merit or good pretensions, and such interference at home must always tend in some degree to weaken the authority of the Government in India.

The mode of choosing the Directors, the term of their continuance in office, and the manner in which they should render an account of their own conduct, and lay statements of the affairs of the Company before the Proprietors of the Stock, with a variety of other points of that nature, will be subjects of regulation upon the present occasion; but upon the supposition of the charters being renewed, it appears to me highly requisite for the public good that the right of inspection and control in the King's Ministers should be extended to every branch of the Company's affairs, without any exception as to their commerce; and as altercations between the controulling power and the Court of Directors must always be detrimental to the public interest, whether occasioned by improper encroachments on one side, or an obstinate or capricious resistance on the other, it seems particularly desirable that not only the extent, but also the manner in which the Ministers are to exercise the right of inspection and controul, should be prescribed so clearly as to prevent, if possible, all grounds for misapprehension or dispute.

I am, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE SECRET COMMITTEE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

(Received March 16, 1792.)

EAST INDIA HOUSE,

September 21, 1791.

MY LORD,

. . . The brilliant successes which by our last accounts have attended your Lordship's operations, give us great room to hope that an honourable and advantageous peace may have been concluded before this despatch can reach India. At all events, from the variety of circumstances of which it is impossible for us to be sufficiently informed beforehand, we do not feel it in our power to give any precise instructions for your Lordship's guidance with respect to the terms on which it may be proper to insist:

that we literally have not the means of carrying on the ordinary business of government.

If necessity should require it, the armies that are prepared must, at all hazards, be put in action; but I certainly would postpone that measure until the last extremity, as I sincerely believe that if all other necessary payments of government were suspended, it would scarcely be possible for us to provide for their support.

With regard to any movement of your own, I certainly do not wish that you should submit to any measure of insult or aggression, but I very much deprecate its taking place. The situation of Scindia and Holkar are in a very considerable degree different, and perhaps it would not be necessary to observe exactly the same conduct towards both of them. I cannot easily define, in the multiplicity of cessions and conquests, what may be considered actually, or what may be regarded virtually, as our territory; but wherever our own Government has been regularly established, I would promptly resist an invasion by either of them.

From the reports I have received from our Residents, I am sorry to find that the States who are most intimately connected with us, such as the Peshwa and the Nizam, are reduced to the most forlorn condition; that these Powers possess no funds or troops on whom they can depend; that anarchy and disaffection prevail universally throughout their dominions; and that unless the British Residents exercised a power and an ascendancy that they ought not to exert, those Governments would be immediately dissolved.

The Rajah of Berar, and other chiefs who have suffered great deprivations, can certainly entertain no friendly disposition towards us, and unless a very great change can be effected in the minds of the natives of India, and in the ideas they must now harbour of our views, I confess that, under all these impressions, I cannot look forward with any sanguine hope to the establishment, by any means in our power, of that happy and permanent peace, which is so much to be desired, and of which you see so fair a prospect..

I have been indisposed for some time, and the complaint has now fallen into my feet, which puts me to great pain; I cannot, therefore, at present, without considerable inconvenience, make more use of my own pen than by signing my name to any letters I have occasion to write.

I am, etc.,

CORNWALLIS.

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PLAN OF THE

*Positions of the army before
S E R R U N G A W A T A
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